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ABSTRACT
Background Relatively little is known about how
scorecards presenting performance indicators
influence medication safety. We evaluated the
effects of implementing a ward-level medication
safety scorecard piloted in two English NHS
hospitals and factors influencing these.
Methods We used a mixed methods, controlled
before and after design. At baseline, wards were
audited on medication safety indicators; during
the ‘feedback’ phase scorecard results were
presented to intervention wards on a weekly basis
over 7 weeks. We interviewed 49 staff, including
clinicians and managers, about scorecard
implementation.
Results At baseline, 18.7% of patients (total
n=630) had incomplete allergy documentation;
53.4% of patients (n=574) experienced a drug
omission in the preceding 24 h; 22.5% of
omitted doses were classified as ‘critical’; 22.1%
of patients (n=482) either had ID wristbands not
reflecting their allergy status or no ID wristband;
and 45.3% of patients (n=237) had drugs that
were either unlabelled or labelled for another
patient in their drug lockers. The quantitative
analysis found no significant improvement in
intervention wards following scorecard feedback.
Interviews suggested staff were interested in
scorecard feedback and described process and
culture changes. Factors influencing scorecard
implementation included ‘normalisation’ of
errors, study duration, ward leadership, capacity
to engage and learning preferences.
Discussion Presenting evidence-based
performance indicators may potentially influence
staff behaviour. Several practical and cultural
factors may limit feedback effectiveness and
should be considered when developing
improvement interventions. Quality scorecards
should be designed with care, attending to
evidence of indicators’ effectiveness and how
indicators and overall scorecard composition fit
the intended audience.
INTRODUCTION
Medication safety is recognised as an
important component of patient safety.1
Medication errors occur frequently,
increasing risk of harm to patients and
costs to health systems.2–10 Interventions
to improve medication safety take numer-
ous forms,11–14 with significant efforts in
recent years to encourage prioritisation
of this safety issue across the English
National Health Service (NHS).3 10 15
Performance indicators are an estab-
lished tool of governance applied at
macro-level (national), meso-level (organ-
isational) and micro-level (service, ward
or individual).16–20 Indicators have two
broad functions in healthcare settings: to
support accountability systems and to
support front-line quality and safety
improvement.17 20 21 Within hospital
organisations, senior leadership may use
quality indicators to assess organisational
progress against strategic objectives.
Research on hospital board governance in
the UK, US and Canada reports increasing
use of quality indicators in organisational
‘dashboards’ to support quality assurance
and improvement, particularly among
‘high-performing’ organisations.22–24
Presenting performance indicators to staff
may align staff with organisational prior-
ities and support quality and safety
improvement.17 20 25 26
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Evidence on using performance indicators to
support quality and safety improvement suggests that
both indicator selection and approach to presentation
are important. Evidence suggests that an indicator is
more effective when there is strong evidence of associ-
ation with improved outcomes, when it closely reflects
the process it aims to measure and when the measured
process is closely related to the desired outcome.18
Adaptation to local contexts is recognised as import-
ant.16 17 Evidence suggests that indicators are best
used formatively to guide discussions of local
improvement. This process benefits from involving
stakeholders and in harnessing ‘soft’ data to
strengthen the indicators’ message.17
Reviews of the evidence on audit and feedback in
healthcare settings indicate that this technique can
positively influence behaviour, but that such effects
tend to be small and variable.27–30 Reviews indicate
that factors underlying the varying effects of audit
and feedback, and how the technique might be tai-
lored to different settings, require further exploration.
In support of this, rigorous mixed methods evaluation
is recommended.27–29 As with audit and feedback,
reviews identify a need for greater empirical evidence
on the use of performance indicators,16 17 with a par-
ticular focus on issues of implementation.17 Reviews
of quality and safety improvement and spreading
innovations suggest it is important to understand the
nature of an intervention, how it is implemented and
the context into which it is introduced.31–35
In this study, we aimed to evaluate the effects of
implementing a ward-level medication safety score-
card in two NHS hospitals in a large English city and
examine factors influencing these effects. We first
present the scorecard’s development and implementa-
tion. In evaluating its effects, we consider quantitative
and qualitative evidence of changes that occurred with
the introduction of scorecard feedback. We also
analyse the extent to which these effects were influ-
enced by the scorecard contents, feedback approach
and organisational setting in which the work took
place. We are therefore able to examine factors influ-
encing governance of medication safety. Further,
based on the analysis, we identify lessons for using
quality and safety indicators at ward level.
METHODS
Design
This was a mixed methods study. The quantitative com-
ponent was a controlled before and after analysis of per-
formance on a ward-level medication safety scorecard.
The qualitative component was based on interviews
with hospital staff about governance of medication
safety and experiences of scorecard feedback. Drawing
these components together permitted understanding of
how and why the intervention influenced staff behav-
iour, whether there were any unintended consequences
and what factors were influential.36 37
A process of triangulation was applied, where the
two research components were analysed separately,
with the results drawn together where appropriate.38
First, we examined qualitative and quantitative data to
evaluate how scorecard feedback influenced staff
behaviour. Second, the qualitative analysis explored
implementation issues as a means of understanding
these effects.
Participants
The scorecard was developed and piloted in two acute
NHS hospital organisations situated in a large English
city (hereafter referred to as Hospitals A and B).
In each hospital, we recruited three wards: two
‘intervention’ wards and one ‘control’. In Hospital A,
all three wards were general medicine wards. In
Hospital B, two general medicine wards and an
elderly care ward were recruited, with one general
medicine ward acting as the control.
We interviewed 25 staff in Hospital A and 24 staff
in Hospital B. Interviewees included a range of profes-
sionals and managers working at ward level and in
governance of quality and patient safety (see online
supplementary appendix A).
Procedure
Developing the scorecard
The study was developed and implemented in collabor-
ation with staff in both hospitals. Our approach
sought to harness potential benefits of knowledge
co-production, such as increased sensitivity to local
context and greater relevance of findings to end
users.39 40 A mapping exercise conducted in Hospital A
identified a gap in knowledge of how medication safety
is governed on wards.41 A group of senior clinicians and
management with responsibilities for governing quality
and safety in Hospital A proposed developing and pilot-
ing a ward-level medication safety scorecard. This inter-
vention was proposed based on the view that a
‘scorecard culture’, where staff prioritise safety issues
that appear on scorecards, existed in the hospital.
A senior pharmacist led selection of indicators, which
were chosen for their recognised importance to medica-
tion safety.3 10 Performance was coded red (non-
compliant) or green (compliant) and presented relative
to the previous week’s performance (figure 1A).
While the overall structure of the scorecard was
retained for Hospital B, the content was amended.
Following suggestions from both Hospital A and B
staff, the revised scorecard featured fewer indicators
overall; also, following Hospital B pharmacists’ rec-
ommendation, indicators related to prescribing were
added (figure 1B). This process reflects the pragmatic
nature of quality improvement, where learning and
local intelligence guide adaptation of indicators.16 17
Performance was coded red (not compliant), amber
(partly compliant) or green (compliant) and again pre-
sented relative to the previous week’s performance.
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Scorecard data collection
In both hospitals, scorecard data were collected on
unannounced ward visits. In Hospital A, in the base-
line phase ( July 2009–February 2010), data were col-
lected by AR and pharmacists. During the feedback
phase, data were collected weekly by AR and a
member of audit staff. In Hospital B, ST and pharma-
cists collected scorecard data over the period
September–November 2011.
Figure 1 (A) Scorecard used in Hospital A. (B) Scorecard used in Hospital B. Note: FFP stands for ‘fresh frozen plasma’.
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Feedback to ward staff
In Hospital A, scorecard data were sent to ward
leaders in intervention wards on a weekly basis over
7 weeks (February–April 2010). It was agreed that
ward managers would present the scorecard to nurses
at ward handover meetings and that consultants
would present the data at junior doctors’ educational
meetings.
In Hospital B, data were fed back on a weekly basis
to intervention wards over 7 weeks (October–
November 2011). Feedback took place at established
staff meetings (some uniprofessional, some multipro-
fessional) attended by STand a Hospital B pharmacist.
In these meetings, staff discussed the scorecard data,
identifying possible causes of and potential solutions
to the issues identified. Using established meetings in
both hospitals permitted examination of existing
approaches to governing medication safety in the par-
ticipating organisations.
Interviews
In each hospital, interviews were conducted once the
intervention phases were complete. Interviews lasted
between 15 and 60 min in locations agreed with inter-
viewees. Interviewees discussed aspects of medication
safety and their experiences of providing and receiv-
ing scorecard feedback. Interviews were digitally
recorded and professionally transcribed. Transcripts
were stored for analysis on QSR NVivo software.
Analysis
To analyse the effects of scorecard feedback, we
applied a standard ‘difference in difference’ tech-
nique.42 Difference in difference is a
quasi-experimental technique that measures the effect
induced by a treatment, policy or intervention. It com-
bines within-subject estimates of the effect (pretreat-
ment and post-treatment) with between-subject
estimates of the effect (intervention vs control
groups). Using only between-subject estimates pro-
duces biased results if there are omitted variables that
confound the difference between the two groups.
Similarly, using only the within-group estimate pro-
duces biased results if there is a time trend present
(eg, wards are always improving). The difference in
Figure 1 Continued.
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difference estimate combines the estimates and pro-
duces a more robust measure of the effect of an
intervention.
The independent variables were ‘ward type’, ‘study
phase’ and ‘effect’:
▸ ‘Ward type’ measured the difference between interven-
tion wards, where scorecard data were presented to staff,
and control wards, where no data were presented.
▸ ‘Study phase’ measured the difference between the base-
line phase, during which data were collected but not fed
back, and the feedback phase, during which data contin-
ued to be collected and were fed back to intervention
wards.
▸ ‘Effect’ was the interaction (multiplication) of the ‘ward
type’ and ‘study phase’ variables and isolated ‘effect’ of
the intervention on the intervention wards. This was the
so-called ‘difference in difference’ estimator.
Dependent variables were wards’ performance on
four indicators featured on the medication safety
scorecard: we measured the proportion of patients
experiencing a risk on these indicators (table 1).
These were selected because they were identified by
both the participating hospitals and in guidance as
important factors in medication safety.3 Standard
ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate
the four difference in difference models.
Qualitative analysis
Interviews were analysed using data-driven thematic
analysis.43 In part, the quantitative analysis guided our
focus. Analysing staff response to scorecard feedback
permitted examination of effects not captured by the
scorecard, and factors influencing the process and
effects of feedback. Based on this, lessons for future
implementation of scorecards of this kind were
identified.
RESULTS
Quantitative analysis
Table 2 presents performance on medication safety
indicators at baseline in terms of the percentage of
instances in which patients experienced a medication
safety risk (see column ‘% error’). It indicates that
while performance varied across indicators, a
significant proportion of patients were exposed to
medication safety risks in all cases (see online supple-
mentary appendix B for further breakdown of
patients).
Each drug omission (ie, each dose) was categorised
using a list of ‘critical drugs not to omit’15 developed
by Hospital B. We found that, at baseline, 22.5% of
omitted doses (N=865) could be classified as ‘critical
omissions’, for example, heparin, oxycodone and leve-
tiracetam, where omission or delay in doses increases
the likelihood of outcomes such as mortality, haemor-
rhage and infection (see online supplementary appen-
dix C).
Figure 2 presents performance across the four
selected medication safety indicators disaggregated by
Hospital (A or B), ward type (control or treatment)
and phase (baseline or feedback). Where the gradients
of the lines in figure 2 differ for pairs of wards
(control and intervention) within hospitals, the feed-
back intervention is having an effect and the larger
this divergence, the stronger the effect. The signifi-
cance of these effects was addressed using difference
in difference regression. The data were fitted using
standard ordinary least squares regression, and the
Table 1 Summary of medication safety risks analysed
Indicator Medication safety risks Collection method
Allergy documentation The proportion of patients whose allergy documentation was incomplete
(including symptoms documented, signed and dated)
Inspecting patient drug chart
Drug omissions The proportion of patients who experienced a drug omission in the 24 h
prior to data collection (excluding appropriate omissions, eg, patients
refusing the dose)
Inspecting patient drug chart
ID wristbands The proportion of patients who either had an ID wristband that did not
reflect their allergy status or who had no ID wristband at all
Comparing allergy documentation on drug chart
with colour of patient wristband
Patient’s own drugs
(POD) locker contents
The proportion of patients whose POD lockers contained either
unlabelled drugs or drugs labelled for another patient (in Hospital B
drugs that were not currently prescribed for patient were categorised as
inappropriate)
Comparing patient name on drug chart with
name appearing on drugs in POD locker;
in Hospital B, also comparing with current patient
drug chart
Table 2 Performance on medication safety indicators at baseline
Indicator Hospital
Total
patients
Mean
patients*
(SD)
% error
(SD)
Allergy
documentation
Hospital A 390 20.53 (3.79) 19.3 (9.3)
Hospital B 240 16.00 (3.93) 18.0 (11.5)
Total 630 18.53 (4.43) 18.7 (10.2)
Drug omissions Hospital A 336 16.80 (3.86) 46.7 (15.6)
Hospital B 238 15.87 (3.72) 62.4 (13.9)
Total 574 16.40 (3.78) 53.4 (16.6)
ID wristbands Hospital A 264 12.57 (3.63) 30.9 (20.9)
Hospital B 218 14.53 (3.66) 8.5 (8.0)
Total 482 13.39 (3.72) 22.1 (20.2)
POD locker
contents
Hospital A 397 18.90 (5.43) 29.9 (14.2)
Hospital B 237 15.80 (3.78) 66.9 (18.2)
Total 634 17.61 (5.00) 45.3 (24.3)
*Mean number of patients per ward, per data collection visit.
POD, patient’s own drugs.
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effect on the intervention wards is captured by the
difference in the difference. That is the difference
between the control and treatment wards over the
pretreatment and post-treatment periods. This differ-
ence in difference effect is reported as unstandardised
β coefficient for each of the performance measures in
table 3 alongside the R-squared (R2), which represents
the proportion of variance in the performance
measure that is explained by the regression model.
The statistical significance of the intervention effect is
also indicated.
These models explain only a modest proportion of
the variation in the data. This suggests other factors
might have been influential or that patterns observed
may represent random variation. Two significant
effects were found: in Hospital A, performance on
the ID wristbands and patient’s own drugs (PODs)
lockers indicators improved in the control ward while
deteriorating in intervention wards (illustrated in
figure 2C, and 2D, respectively). No statistically sig-
nificant improvements were associated with presenting
scorecard data to staff.
These data offer two messages: first, on all selected
indicators, many patients were exposed to medication
safety risks at baseline, and second, scorecard feed-
back did not significantly improve this situation in
either hospital.
Qualitative analysis
In this section, we examine factors that might explain
these results. First, we cover some practical issues that
may have limited the effect of scorecard feedback.
Second, we examine how staff perceived the content
of the scorecard and approach to feedback.
Feedback challenges
Scorecard data were not always presented to staff. In
both hospitals, meetings were sometimes cancelled
due to competing priorities or practical issues. The
most pronounced example occurred in a Hospital A
intervention ward:
…there was a weekly juniors’ meeting specifically for
the [Hospital A ward] team. It seems to have gone into
Table 3 Summary of difference in differences analyses
Measure
Hospital A Hospital B
R2 β R2 β
Allergy documentation 0.480 −8.908 0.179 −10.013
Drug omissions 0.184 1.739 0.162 −6.574
ID wristbands 0.201 29.304* 0.025 −4.555
POD lockers 0.240 16.694* 0.167 2.318
β represents the difference in difference effect.
*Signifies p<0.05.
POD, patient’s own drugs.
Figure 2 (A) Percentage of patients with incomplete allergy documentation. (B) Percentage of patients who experienced a drug
omission in the preceding 24 h. (C) Percentage of patients who did not have an appropriately coloured ID wristband (D) Percentage
of patients with inappropriate patient’s own drugs locker contents.
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abeyance […] largely because of lack of space
(Consultant, Hospital A)
Ward managers and consultants were identified as
key to sharing information with nurses and junior
doctors, respectively. However, interviewees suggested
the degree to which clinical leaders engage in such
processes might vary:
…you would just hope that the ward manager would
cascade information. But one couldn’t guarantee that
(Pharmacist, Hospital A)
I was engaged in the conversation, and found it quite
enjoyable, but I looked over at [consultant] and
I know s/he was keen to get back out there
(Consultant, Hospital B)
Some staff also suggested that translating messages
into practice might take more time than the study
period permitted.
Maybe it just takes longer time than the intervention
period to actually get that message through
(Consultant, Hospital B)
Other changes took place over the course of the study.
These included a reorganisation of the Hospital A ward
structure during the baseline phase. Broader issues, such
as staffing and financial pressures, were frequently cited
by interviewees. Taken together, these data indicate that
competing priorities, wider resource issues and variable
engagement of ward leadership may have limited the
effect of scorecard feedback. Such factors are likely to
represent more widely felt obstacles to leading quality
and safety improvement initiatives.44
Staff experiences of scorecard feedback
Nurses were receptive to scorecard feedback, finding
it relevant to their practice:
…some of the things that the scorecard was talking
about, it was like a reinforcement (Nurse, Hospital A)
It brought things forward that we already know as best
practice […], ‘Oh yes, I should get on top of that!’
(Nurse, Hospital B)
In both hospitals, nurses paid particular attention to
feedback on POD locker contents and reported use of
new routines to address the issue:
When you’re cleaning the bed, make sure you tell
them to open the POD locker. Once the POD locker
is opened then you know there’s medicine, take it out
and leave it open, at least there is nothing in there
when the next patient comes in (Nurse, Hospital A)
Now, when a patient gets discharged I always open up
the cabinet and make sure everything is cleared out
(Senior staff nurse, Hospital B)
These data suggest that nurses found scorecard
feedback useful and sought to translate it into prac-
tice. This reflects scorecards’ potential to support
quality improvement when a measure is perceived as
relevant and performance is seen as suboptimal.
However, given the levels of error presented, it is
interesting to note that the overall response demon-
strated relatively little urgency. This was also a
common theme in doctors’ responses to scorecard
feedback:
So… just useful information to know but I’m not sure
if it necessarily altered how we did things. ( Junior
Doctor, Hospital A)
In Hospital B, doctors frequently referred to pre-
scribing measures as useful, reflecting staff prioritisa-
tion of issues perceived as relevant to their own
practice:
The prescribing stuff is useful, particularly for the
junior staff—reiterating the need to prescribe differ-
ently (Doctor, Hospital B)
Well, it has made me more mindful of not prescribing
trade names (Consultant, Hospital B)
Junior doctors frequently referred to learning about
medication safety directly from ward pharmacists,
while medical consultants emphasised uniprofessional
approaches to learning typified by the ‘apprenticeship’
model, where doctors reflect on individual practice
under the guidance of more experienced peers.45–50
Scorecards and traffic lights are very familiar now […]
actually it doesn’t really fit that well in terms of [the]
medical model of working. (Consultant, Hospital A)
I think that using the clinical supervisor or the educa-
tion supervisor would be a more effective way of
getting that kind of targeted feedback to me as an
individual (Consultant, Hospital A)
Our data suggest nurses engaged more with score-
card feedback than doctors. These differences may
reflect a contrast in how well the scorecard approach
fitted with doctors’ and nurses’ established approaches
to improvement. This ‘lack of fit’ may have reduced
the extent to which doctors engaged with the score-
card intervention. However, another potential factor
is the relative likelihood of sanction:
If a nurse commits a serious medicines error, they’re
removed from their responsibilities. If a doctor
commits a serious medicines error, it doesn’t happen:
there’s no censure at all (Consultant, Hospital B)
Considering the overall composition of the score-
card revealed a potential source of tension. While
staff engaged with ‘their’ indicators, some stated that
indicators associated with other professions were not
relevant. However, the potential for a joint scorecard
to encourage staff to take a wider view of their role in
medication safety was noted:
in retrospect we would have been better to do that
jointly with the nursing staff because […] for the nurses
Original research
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to hear the doctors say, ‘Well, that’s not my job,’ might
have been quite useful, because they could have said,
‘Well, actually, it would be really helpful if you would
look at that aspect’ (Consultant, Hospital A)
I think it’s helped nurses […]to go up to the doctors
and say, “You’ve written the brand name,” […] or if
their writing’s not clear: I think it’s making us look
more enabled (Deputy ward manager, Hospital B)
Thus, the relationship between the content of feed-
back and the forum in which it is to be presented is
important. Where feedback is presented to a multipro-
fessional group, a mixed scorecard may prompt valu-
able discussion and negotiation of roles; where
feedback is presented to a single profession, a mixed
scorecard may include indicators perceived as irrele-
vant to their practice, and its effect diluted. Further,
joint feedback sessions should be led with care to
ensure discussions do not become an outlet for blame
rather than learning.
DISCUSSION
Our data confirm previous research suggesting medi-
cation safety risks occur frequently.2–9 It also indicates
that a notable proportion of these errors had the
potential to cause harm. In relation to the impact of
scorecard feedback, the quantitative analysis found no
significant improvements. However, our qualitative
data suggested staff were highly receptive to the data
presented and importantly that staff reported that
feedback prompted both process and culture changes.
These findings support previous research that suggests
presenting quality indicators may encourage engage-
ment with patient safety issues, but with limited effect
on actual performance.28 29 Our results also reflect a
wider evidence base indicating that improvement
initiatives may often have limited or no demonstrable
effect on quality, and that this may often be associated
with contextual factors.33 51
Our qualitative analysis revealed a number of con-
textual factors, practical and cultural, that may
mediate the effect of scorecard feedback. Practical
factors identified by staff included the capacity for
staff to engage with feedback and the capacity to
translate feedback into practice, for example, having
time to design and embed new processes: these are
established obstacles to quality improvement
work.16 31 33 44 Significant cultural factors included
how staff respond to data indicating poor perform-
ance, and professions’ different styles of engaging
with quality improvement activity. The lack of
urgency in staff response to the feedback was notable.
This may reflect a wider cultural issue of ‘normalised
deviance’, where frequent errors are perceived as
unsurprising or even acceptable. Such normalisation
has been identified as a potentially significant risk to
patient safety.51–53 This may relate to what Francis
described as ‘a culture of habituation and passivity’ in
his report into poor quality care at Mid Staffordshire
NHS Foundation Trust.54 Our data support previous
research indicating that different professions engage
differently with quality and safety improvement activ-
ity.35 45–48 55–57 Doctors’ and nurses’ responses also
support previous research indicating that staff engage
with performance indicators that are seen as relevant
to practice and associated with quality and safety out-
comes.16 However, a corollary of this is that ‘irrele-
vant’ indicators may dilute a scorecard’s credibility,
unless an objective of scorecard feedback is to encour-
age shared understanding of medication safety across
professions, facilitated through feedback to multipro-
fessional meetings.
This study has some limitations. First, that our
intervention fitted poorly with doctors’ approach to
quality and safety improvement suggests a key assump-
tion of the study—existence of a ‘scorecard culture’—
was not borne out. Widening our collaborative
process to include a wider range of front-line staff
may have highlighted this and encouraged reflection
on how best to communicate with different profes-
sions. Second, the interventions did not take place
concurrently in Hospitals A and B. The intervening
18-month period may have seen changes in local and
national contexts. However, interviewees indicated
that the contextual issues faced by the participating
hospitals were quite consistent. Third, the scorecards
used in Hospitals A and B differed and this may have
had an effect on the results. For example, the differ-
ence between Hospital A’s and Hospital B’s perform-
ance on POD locker contents at baseline may reflect
the additional criteria applied for ‘appropriate label-
ling’ in Hospital B. Given the potential influence of
scorecard composition, the fact that the scorecards
used in Hospitals A and B differed in terms of
number and nature of indicators selected may be
important. The presence of other indicators on score-
cards may have influenced staff response, that is, a
higher number of indicators may reduce the effect of
specific indicators. However, the differences in timing
and indicators used reflect this study’s sequential
approach. This approach permitted learning across the
two interventions, reflecting recommendations for
developing effective quality and safety improvement
interventions.16 17 Fourth, as intervention and control
wards experienced the same data collection process,
the potential effects of being audited should also be
acknowledged. Control ward staff may have changed
behaviour because of an awareness that they were
being measured; they may even have become aware of
specific indicators being measured (eg, the visibility of
POD locker and ID wristband inspections) and
adjusted their behaviour accordingly.58 Fifth, in terms
of capturing the effect of the scorecard, research indi-
cates that the intervention and associated data collec-
tion period was too short.16 This may have limited
the extent to which staff had time to make and embed
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changes, and for these to translate into improved
medication safety. Finally, while interviews com-
menced after completion of the feedback phase, the
quantitative analysis had not been completed. There
may be value in incorporating quantitative findings,
that is, whether the intervention had a significant
effect into evaluation interviews.
Turning to future work, we found the mixed
methods approach valuable in understanding the
effect of scorecard feedback. However, we propose
amending this approach to build on the learning and
limitations identified above. Future research might
address feedback approach and duration, scorecard
design and evaluation methods. First, parallel imple-
mentation in two or more hospitals, using consistent
wards, would allow clearer understanding of how
similar wards in different organisational settings
engage with quality and safety indicators. Second,
using the same scorecard across all participating wards
(developed in collaboration with all participating hos-
pitals) would permit a stronger focus on how tool
composition interacts with varying organisational set-
tings. Testing the relationship between indicators and
audience at other organisational levels, for example,
hospital boards’ interactions with quality dashboards,
may provide valuable insights on how best to support
leadership for quality improvement.22–24 Third,
greater use of observational methods would allow a
clearer understanding of processes at work in
improvement work of this kind, including the extent
to which control ward staff are influenced by factors
such as the act of measurement and ‘contamination’
from wards that receive feedback.59 60 Key foci would
include feedback sessions and the embedding of any
changes identified in response to feedback. Finally, a
longer follow-up period would be valuable. This
would allow staff sufficient time to incorporate find-
ings into process redesign, and for these changes to be
adopted by staff. It would permit exploration of
staff ’s initial responses to interventions and their
views on the nature and sustainability of changes
brought about in the longer term.
CONCLUSIONS
Medication errors occur frequently at ward level.
Presenting evidence of this in the form of a scorecard
has limited effect on staff performance. Established
factors, including organisational processes and profes-
sional cultures, remain influential mediators of
change. The persistence of these meso-level issues,
relatively unchanged from past research in this area,
suggests that efforts to prioritise and improve medica-
tion safety across the English NHS are yet to gain
traction.3 10 15
Our findings indicate that presenting evidence-based
performance indicators has the potential to influence
staff behaviour. However, when applying such inter-
ventions it is important to allow sufficient time for
such changes to translate into overall performance
improvements. Further, there exist several practical
and cultural contextual factors that may limit the
effectiveness of feedback, and which should be con-
sidered when developing the improvement strategy.
When selecting performance indicators, the extent to
which they fit the task and the setting should be
assessed, and the feedback approach should be consid-
ered carefully. Further research on scorecard compos-
ition and implementation, drawing on the lessons
above, may contribute to clearer understanding of
how performance indicators might be used effectively
in a range of healthcare settings.
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